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P.F. Strawson (1919-2006) was one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth-century. 
His career centred around Oxford – first as Tutor and Fellow at University College, then as 
Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. His careful, thoughtful, 
and characteristically elegant written work was influential in moving Oxford philosophy from the 
anti-metaphysical leanings of A.J. Ayer and J.L. Austin to a renewed and rejuvenated era of 
traditional philosophy theorising, albeit domesticated in a distinctively Strawsonian fashion. His 
influence on British philosophy persists through a generation of students who were brought up on 
his writings. 
 
Peter Frederick Strawson was born in London on November 23, 1919. He arrived in Oxford in 
1937 on scholarship to study English at St. John's College, Oxford, but decided to change to 
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), in part because of the international political climate. 
Philosophy, he found, ‘congenial and absorbing’ from the start. His main philosophy tutor was 
J.D. Mabbott, a respected political philosopher and later head of the college. And he also had one 
term’s tuition with H. P. Grice, whom Strawson later described as ‘one of the cleverest and most 
ingenious thinkers of our time’. 
 
St John’s were initially reluctant to allow Strawson to change to PPE on the grounds that he would 
not get a first-class mark. This prediction was proved correct, but rumour had it that Strawson’s 
second-class mark was a result, in part, of the younger of his two examiners leaving Strawson’s 
exam scripts in the back of a taxi, and thus not being able to argue the case for a higher mark 
against the view of the older, more conservative, examiner. He was called up to military service, 
attaining the rank of captain, and when he left the military in 1946, took up a post in Philosophy 
at the University College of North Wales, Bangor. 
 
It was his award of the prestigious John Locke prize – awarded on the basis of a written examination 
to philosophy graduates in Oxford – which enabled his return to Oxford, his answers sufficiently 
impressing Gilbert Ryle that he recommended Strawson to University College, Oxford, where he 
was appointed first as a lecturer, and then as a Fellow in 1948. He had thus achieved what, at the 
age of 21 was his ambition: to be a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy in Oxford. 
 
Strawon’s name was made almost immediately through two articles published in 1950: ‘On 
Referring’, published in MIND, and a debate with J.L. Austin about truth, published in the 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. In both cases, Strawson was up against a big-name 
philosopher: Bertrand Russell, in the case of his paper in MIND, and J.L. Austin, the current 
dominant figure in Oxford philosophy, in the debate about truth. In both cases Strawson was 
judged by many to have won the battle. The debate with Austin was particularly important, since 
it was unheard of for someone to take Austin on at his own game: with a careful, almost forensic, 
analysis of the ordinary ways in which we talk. 
 
‘On Referring’ is, in part, a criticism of Russell's famous article ‘On Denoting’. The topic of both 
papers is reference – and, in particular, the ways in which we refer to things by use of the definite 
description ‘the’. (It is a mark of philosophy that so much can turn on so little a word.) Consider 
the statement ‘The Prime Minister is tired’. And contrast it with the statement ‘A Prime Minister 
is tired’. How does the former differ from the latter? According to Russell, the latter statement tells 
you that there exists a Prime Minister, and it (she) is tired. The former statement, the one which 
uses a definite description, works exactly the same way except that it also adds that there are no 
other Prime Ministers. That is, ‘The Prime Minister is tired’ says ‘There is one and only one Prime 
Minister and it is tired’. Perhaps this sounds strange – and Strawson’s insight in his reply is based 
in part on the observation that it should sound strange – but Russell’s theory had achieved 
orthodoxy by the time of Strawson’s writing, and was thought to be a philosophically illuminating 
account of one small but important aspect of ordinary language. 
 
Strawson raised a range of objections to Russell’s proposal. One of his points is that Russell’s view 
implies that statements of the form ‘The F is G’ are false when there is no F in question. For Russell, 
this was a merit of the view. If I say to you ‘The King of France is bald’, my statement is false, 
precisely because there is no King of France. But Strawson pointed out that we do not always treat 
such statements as false. In some cases, perhaps in many cases, we would not say that the statement 
is false, but that it does not make sense – that it is not even false.  For Strawson, sentences can be 
neither true nor false, and some of Russell’s cases fall into that category. This showed, he thought, 
that Russell’s analysis cannot be the whole story about reference. 
 
If it was these early papers which made Strawson’s name, it was his books Individuals (1959) and 
The Bounds of Sense (1966) which cemented his reputation and helped move British philosophy in 
a new direction. In the first half of the twentieth-century, British philosophy was going through 
one of its regular periods of metaphysical hostility. For the logical positivists, such as A.J. Ayer, 
and for the careful, language-focused philosophers, such as J.L. Austin, metaphysics was a domain 
of wild speculation, where philosophical claims went beyond the limits of sense and significance. 
Strawson’s writings allowed a return to metaphysical theorising, albeit theorising which was 
constrained by a lingering respect for the anti-metaphysical arguments of his predecessors. 
 
The return to a form of metaphysics is announced in the subtitle to Individuals: ‘An Essay in 
Descriptive Metaphysics’. The contrast, as Strawson outlines it in his Introduction, is with 
‘revisionary metaphysics’. ‘Descriptive metaphysics’, he tells us, ‘is content to describe the actual 
structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better 
structure’. Descriptive metaphysics takes there to be ways of thinking about the world which are 
common across time and space, and the role of the descriptive metaphysician is to outline these 
universal forms of thought. Revisionary metaphysics, in contrast, wants to emend or reject these 
ways of thinking. This contrast has entered the philosophical lexicon, and many philosophers have 
used it as part of their self-image. But one way to see the perhaps problematic nature of the contrast 
is to consider the five philosophers whom Strawson classes within his schema: Descartes, Leibniz, 
Berkeley, Aristotle, and Kant. Without looking, could one predict which category each is said to 
belong to? (Strawson gives the first three as examples of revisionary metaphysicians, and the latter 
two as descriptive.) 
 
The aim of Individuals is to outline the concepts used in thinking about particular things in the 
world. One of the most discussed chapters – and one which most readily illustrates the way in 
which the rarefied world of philosophical analysis can interact with the wildest science-fiction – is 
the second chapter in which Strawson attempts to determine how important our idea of space is 
for our thinking about an objective world. Strawson imagines in this chapter a sound world – one 
in which a person has only auditory experience – in order to see how much sense can be made of 
the idea of objectivity without the idea of space. The chapter is intellectually fascinating, and 
showcases a certain sort of British temperament and style which can be found in many writings 
from the period. 
 
Strawson wrote primarily on a range of issues in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and 
epistemology, but his work on all of these topics was informed by a close engagement with people 
and ideas from the history of philosophy. Prime amongst these was Immanuel Kant. Strawson’s 
introduction to Kant arose out of the historical peculiarities of the PPE degree. This was structured, 
in Strawson’s day, such that there were two special subjects which those who wished to specialise 
in philosophy were obliged to take: Logic and Kant. The latter was to be studied through the 
Critique of Pure Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and when studying the 
first Critique, Strawson tells us, he found ‘a depth, a range, a boldness, and a power unlike anything 
I had previously encountered’. 
 
The influence of Strawson’s engagement with Kant can be seen in Individuals. But it was his 
ground-breaking and influential commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason, The Bounds of Sense 
(1966), which demonstrated the importance of Kantian ideas for contemporary philosophical 
discussions and, in the words of one philosopher, ‘opened the way to a reception of Kant’s 
philosophy by analytic philosophers’. Strawson’s aim was to detach and defend what he saw as 
valuable in the first Critique from that which was dodgy and downright dubious, what Strawson 
called the ‘imaginary subject of transcendental psychology’. The result was a fascinating and 
insightful account, not perhaps of what Kant said, but of what Kant ought to have said, had he 
had the good fortune to have read some recent Oxford philosophy. 
 
I have mentioned Strawson’s work in language, mind, and metaphysics. And he always joked that 
he would turn to moral philosophy only when his powers were waning. Nevertheless, his most 
famous article, and the one which may persist the longest, is perhaps ‘Freedom and Resentment’, 
a small and suggestive paper which aims to dissolve the problem of determinism and responsibility. 
In this paper Strawson draws attention to our ‘reactive attitudes’: attitudes such as gratitude, anger, 
sympathy and resentment. These attitudes are part of our human life, we cannot imagine what it 
would be like to be human without them. They thus are not subject to justification or entitlement 
from grand metaphysical theses. The conflict, then, between determinism and responsibility is 
largely illusory. 
 
This paper captures one of the central themes of Strawson’s work: a relaxed sympathy for our 
ordinary ways of thinking about ourselves and our role in the world. In his discussion with Russell, 
Strawson brought us back to the way in which we use definite descriptions, in our conversations 
with each other, in our talk about the world. In Individuals, it is our ways of thinking which are 
under consideration, not the ways of thinking of some purified, logical creatures which might be 
related to us, and which we might become. And in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, it is the ways in 
which we react to each other and hold each other to account which are the focus, ways which are 
insulated from philosophical theorising about grand metaphysics. Across these philosophical 
debates, Strawson never loses sight of our humanity. 
 
Strawson’s commitment to our ordinary ways of thinking comes out in a certain sort of relaxed 
realism which became characteristic of a strand of Oxford philosophy. This relaxed realism – 
Strawson sometimes called it a liberal naturalism – stands in opposition to two pulls in philosophy. 
The first is that of scepticism or eliminativism which cannot find a way to make sense of some aspect 
of our ordinary life – say, the colours of objects, or moral values, or our capacity to make free 
decisions. The sceptic cannot find room for these items in the natural world, and thus recommends 
that we eliminate them from our ways of thinking. Objects are not really coloured, there are really 
no moral values, we are not really free. The sceptic is a revisionary metaphysician who charges our 
ordinary ways of thinking with confusion and error. 
 
The second pull is that of reductionism. The reductionist disagrees with the sceptic as to the 
existence of these ordinary items. But she agrees that if these things are to exist, it must be because 
space can be found for them in the natural world. She concludes, then, that these ordinary things 
can be reduced to something whose status as naturalistically respectable is not in doubt. Objects 
really are coloured – but that is because colours are nothing more than the microphysical 
reflectance properties of surfaces. There really are moral values – but that is because moral values 
are nothing more, say, than that which is beneficial to us. And we are really free – but that is 
because freedom requires nothing more than that we act in accordance with our desires, however 
those desires were formed. 
 
Strawson’s instinctive tendencies lie opposed to each of these extremes, and one can see his work, 
in different ways across a wide variety of debates, as showing how ordinary thought can be defended 
against both of these tendencies. The mistake each makes is the mistake of thinking that 
justification for our ordinary ways of thinking can only be found by making those ways of thinking 
accord with some etiolated scientific conception of how things are. The sceptic cannot see a way 
of making an accord, and thus finds our ordinary ways of thinking to be wanting. The reductionist 
defends our ordinary ways of thinking, but only by reducing them to something more scientifically 
respectable. Strawson’s relaxed realism has no truck with the idea that our natural metaphysics is 
beholden to the physical sciences for its legitimacy, and thus finds no need to eliminate or reduce. 
 
Indeed, not only is there no conflict between our ordinary ways of thinking and a scientific story 
about how the world works, Strawson argued that the former must itself take precedence. We are 
humans before we are scientists and philosophers, and it is to our human ways of thinking that our 
scientific and metaphysical stories must ultimately defer. Scientific ways of thinking are important 
to our lives, but they are only one way in which we can think about the world, and they neither 
show the falsity of nor take precedence over our ordinary forms of thought. 
 
Strawson often said that had he been able to choose his gifts, he would have chosen to be a poet. 
And there is something of the poet’s careful attention to the ordinary and the words with which 
to express it in Strawson’s measured prose. His original and important contributions shaped British 
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